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What	  Should	  a	  Powers-­‐Based	  Theory	  of	  Free	  Will	  Be	  About?	  Ruth	  Groff	  	  	  
1.	  Caveats	  and	  context	  	  These	  comments	  are	  extrapolations	  from	  a	  lengthy	  diagnostic	  paper	  about	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  Humean-­‐inflected	  free	  will	  problematic	  if	  one	  adopt	  a	  powers-­‐based	  metaphysics.	  	  Technically	  speaking,	  it’s	  sublated:	  both	  terms	  –	  free	  will	  and	  determinism	  (compatibilism	  and	  incompatibilism,	  too)	  –	  acquire	  new	  meanings,	  such	  that	  the	  old	  opposition	  is	  superseded.	  	  That	  paper,	  in	  turn,	  was	  a	  follow-­‐up	  to	  a	  chapter	  in	  a	  book	  that	  I’ve	  recently	  written,	  on	  how	  Humeanism	  shapes	  theorizing	  about	  agents	  and	  the	  social	  –	  including	  how	  it	  is	  built	  into	  the	  free	  will	  debate	  in	  analytic	  philosophy.	  	  So	  today’s	  comments	  presume	  a	  lot	  of	  argument,	  but	  are	  themselves	  mainly	  bald	  assertions.	  	  Still,	  hopefully	  they	  are	  interesting	  ones.	  	  	  	  
2.	  What	  exactly	  is	  the	  contemporary	  free	  will	  problem	  a	  problem	  of?	  	  	  The	  standard	  framing	  of	  the	  problem	  isn’t	  perspicacious.	  	  From	  a	  powers-­‐based	  perspective,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  agency	  is	  threatened	  by	  what	  post-­‐Cartesians	  have	  come	  to	  think	  causation	  is	  (or	  isn’t).	  	  	  	  There	  are	  two	  tributaries	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  	  	  
• The	  first	  is	  nomological	  necessitation,	  already	  clear	  in	  Descartes,	  but	  given	  full	  expression	  in	  Kant.	  	  This	  source	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  well	  appreciated	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  	  
• The	  second	  is	  the	  passivist	  rejection	  of	  dynamism,	  given	  full	  expression	  in	  Hume’s	  repudiation	  of	  powers.	  	  This	  source	  is	  less	  well	  appreciated.	  	  	  	  Both	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  can’t	  cause	  anything.	  	  	  	  
• Nomological	  determinism	  implies	  that	  *we*	  can’t	  cause	  anything	  (as	  it	  is	  laws,	  or	  conditions	  arranged	  in	  a	  lawful	  fashion,	  that	  “cause”	  things,	  i.e.,	  sustain	  the	  appearance	  of	  productive	  causation;	  moreover,	  the	  laws/arrangements	  are	  invariant);	  it	  also	  generates	  an	  “other,”	  viz.,	  a-­‐causal	  spontaneity,	  which	  equally	  precludes	  agential	  causal	  purchase.	  	  
• Passivism	  implies	  that	  we	  can’t	  *cause*	  anything	  (as,	  strictly	  speaking,	  nothing	  can	  –	  at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  realist	  sense	  of	  bringing	  something	  about	  –	  given	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  causal	  powers).	  	  	  	  
• There	  is	  obvious	  tension	  between	  these	  two	  points,	  but	  they	  have	  nonetheless	  been	  fused	  in	  certain	  interesting	  ways	  in	  contemporary	  neo-­‐Humeanism.	  	  	  	  	  
3.	  What	  are	  the	  structural	  limitations	  of	  event-­‐causal	  libertarianism,	  event-­‐causal	  
compatibilism	  and	  standard	  agent-­‐causal	  accounts	  as	  responses	  to	  the	  post-­‐Cartesian	  
problem?	  	  
Event-­‐causal	  libertarianism	  and	  event-­‐causal	  compatibilism	  leave	  the	  governing	  presuppositions	  
in	  place.	  	  Both	  therefore	  require	  their	  proponents	  to	  accept	  that	  agents	  can’t	  cause	  anything.	  Standard	  agent-­‐causalists	  reject	  the	  governing	  presupposition,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  by	  engaging	  in	  
metaphysical	  special	  pleading	  for	  humans,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  an	  otherwise	  unchallenged	  underlying	  passivist,	  neo-­‐Humean	  metaphysics.	  	  	  
4.	  What	  is	  free	  will	  taken	  to	  be	  by	  those	  who	  accept	  that	  agents	  can’t	  cause	  things?	  	  	  Proposed	  alternative	  content	  for	  free	  will	  includes:	  	  	  
• escape	  from	  causation	  	  	  
• either	  altogether,	  or	  in	  the	  spaces	  left	  open	  by	  probabilistic	  laws;	  
• acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  duty;	  
• acting	  for	  a	  reason;	  (or	  for	  reason	  as	  such)	  	  
• getting	  to	  do	  what	  one	  wants	  to	  do/not	  being	  coerced;	  	  
• having	  been	  able	  to	  do	  otherwise,	  had	  one	  wanted	  to	  do	  otherwise	  	  
• getting	  to	  choose	  what	  one’s	  wants	  are;	  	  
• choosing	  one’s	  wants	  &/or	  courses	  of	  action	  well	  (according	  to	  some	  designated	  criteria,	  e.g.,	  internal	  harmony,	  2nd	  order	  desires).	  	  	  
5.	  What	  does	  the	  powers-­‐based	  theorist	  need	  to	  establish	  metaphysically,	  in	  order	  to	  show	  
that	  agency	  is	  possible	  in	  the	  face	  of	  causation	  ?	  
	  S/he	  needs	  to	  establish	  the	  reality	  of	  emergent	  entities	  (agents),	  who	  can	  initiate	  causal	  
processes,	  via	  the	  exercise	  of	  real	  causal	  powers	  borne	  by	  them	  as	  sentient	  substances.	  	  At	  the	  level	  of	  metaphysics,	  therefore,	  s/he	  needs:	  	  
• Dynamism;	  i.e.	  powers	  that	  are	  not	  elliptical	  versions	  of	  stimulus-­‐response	  sequences	  
• Viable	  causal	  bearers	  thereof	  (substances,	  objects,	  or	  entities	  that	  are	  powerful	  particulars)	  
• Causation	  as	  irreducibly	  dynamic	  doing,	  by	  powerful	  particulars,	  here	  agents	  
• Emergence	  
	  
• Agents	  who	  don’t	  reduce	  to	  their	  bodies	  
• Mental	  powers	  that	  don’t	  reduce	  to	  physical	  powers	  	  	  	  
6.	  What	  does	  the	  powers	  theorist	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  at	  the	  level	  of	  epistemology,	  if	  s/he	  is	  
to	  pick	  out	  token	  instances	  of	  free	  will?	  	  S/he	  will	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  when	  it	  is	  indeed	  the	  agent	  who	  has	  initiated	  the	  causal	  process.	  	  I	  will	  call	  this	  the	  task	  of	  identifying	  authorship.	  	  
• This	  task	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  fixing	  control,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  metaphysics.	  	  The	  agent	  has	  causal	  control	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  the	  cause,	  when	  she	  is	  the	  cause.	  	  	  	  
• It’s	  a	  genuine	  task	  (closer	  to	  the	  standard	  of	  problem	  of	  source-­‐hood	  than	  to	  that	  of	  luck),	  but	  it	  is	  made	  easier	  than	  those	  problems	  are	  for	  Humeans	  by	  the	  non-­‐transitivity	  of	  causation	  (or	  at	  least	  punctuated	  nature	  thereof)	  on	  at	  least	  some	  powers	  accounts.	  	  
	  
	  
7.	  Distractions	  re:	  authorship	  	  Re:	  external	  putative	  authors:	  	  	  
• As	  a	  matter	  of	  ontology,	  one	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  initiated	  a	  causal	  process,	  even	  if	  one	  has	  done	  so	  at	  the	  command	  (loosely	  speaking)	  of	  another	  entity.	  	  	  	  
• The	  problem	  of	  identifying	  token	  instances	  of	  free	  will	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  moral	  culpability	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  causal	  process	  that	  an	  agent	  has	  indeed	  initiated	  (or	  attempted	  to	  initiate)	  or	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  socio-­‐political	  freedom.	  	  	  	  Re:	  internal	  putative	  authors:	  	  
• As	  a	  matter	  of	  ontology,	  one	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  initiated	  a	  causal	  process	  even	  if	  having	  done	  so	  is	  not	  in	  accord	  with	  one’s	  best	  or	  truest	  self,	  or	  with	  one’s	  second-­‐order	  desires.	  	  Agents	  who	  are	  addicts	  initiate	  causal	  processes.	  	  
• The	  problem	  of	  identifying	  token	  instances	  of	  free	  will	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  issues	  of	  well-­‐being,	  e.g.,	  internal	  psychic	  harmony,	  character,	  etc.	  	  	  
• Limit	  case:	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ontology,	  the	  powers	  theorist	  does	  need	  to	  have	  a	  real	  definition	  for	  agent-­‐hood	  (part	  and	  parcel	  of	  #5,	  above).	  	  	  
8.	  What	  should	  a	  powers-­‐based	  theory	  of	  free	  will	  *not*	  be	  about?	  	  	  Here’s	  what	  a	  powers-­‐based	  theory	  of	  free	  will	  needn’t	  be	  about,	  because	  the	  points	  follow	  directly	  from	  the	  underlying	  metaphysics:	  	  
• Reconciling	  agency	  as	  we	  experience	  it	  with	  causal	  determination	  
• From	  a	  powers	  perspective,	  the	  greater	  the	  freedom,	  the	  greater	  the	  degree	  of	  causal	  determination	  
• Resolving	  the	  intelligibility,	  control	  or	  luck	  problems	  faced	  by	  event-­‐causal	  libertarians	  
• Resolving	  the	  “mysterious,”	  “ad	  hoc”	  causation	  problem	  faced	  by	  otherwise	  Humean	  agent-­‐causalists	  	  Here’s	  what	  a	  powers-­‐based	  theory	  of	  free	  will	  shouldn’t	  be	  about,	  because	  the	  issues	  involved	  are	  at	  best	  ancillary	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  free	  will	  per	  se:	  	  
• Moral	  responsibility	  
• Frankfurt	  cases	  
• Psychic	  harmony,	  unity	  and/or	  authenticity	  
• Freedom	  as	  a	  social-­‐political	  phenomenon	  (though	  there	  are	  interesting	  things	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  powers	  metaphysics	  and	  freedom)	  	  
	  
	  
9.	  What	  should	  a	  powers-­‐based	  theory	  of	  free	  will	  be	  about?	  	  Any	  or	  all	  of	  the	  following.	  	  
• On	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  agents	  to	  initiate	  causal	  processes	  via	  their	  powers	  as	  sentient	  subjects:	  articulating	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  displays;	  	  
• Establishing	  the	  metaphysical	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  (as	  per	  #5);	  	  	  
• Specifying	  how	  token	  instances	  of	  such	  acts	  may	  be	  identified	  (as	  per	  #6);	  	  	  
• Further	  exploring	  the	  nature	  of	  sentience	  as	  a	  complex	  power.	  	  	  
10.	  Final	  thoughts	  	  Event-­‐causal	  libertarianism	  and	  event-­‐causal	  compatibilism	  both	  presuppose,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  metaphysics,	  that	  there	  are	  no	  such	  things	  as	  powerful	  particulars,	  sentient	  or	  not.	  	  Powers	  theorists	  think	  that	  there	  are.	  	  It	  is	  because	  they	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  powerful	  particulars,	  that	  event-­‐causal	  libertarian	  and	  event-­‐causal	  compatibilist	  theories	  of	  free	  will	  are	  oblique	  to	  the	  theorizing	  of	  free	  will	  from	  a	  powers-­‐based	  perspective.	  	  Not	  being	  about	  free	  will	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  an	  issue	  isn’t	  worth	  theorizing	  from	  a	  powers-­‐based	  perspective	  –	  or	  that	  the	  metaphysics	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  what	  one	  will	  say	  about	  it.	  
